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Abstract 
We present a wide collection of experiments which show how human behavior deviates 
substantially  with  respect  to the  predictions  derived  from  standard  homo  economicus 
assumptions. 
Then we review the theoretical literature that this evidence has stimulated. In particular 
some models are found to be consistent with evidence from a large set of games. As 
fundamental differences exist among these proposals, new experiments were devised to 
contrast  their  effectiveness  in  predicting  behavior.  We  argue  that  inequality  aversion 
models are to be preferred to intention based models because the additional predictive 
power the latter may have comes at a very high cost of complexity. We also find that 
equality considerations are more relevant than efficiency motives in most economically 




1. Introduction  
 
In this paper we are going to explore experimental evidence and related theories over an 
increasingly lively debate in economics: whether it is reasonable to leave the standard 
assumption of selfishness as a reasonable approximation of agents’ motivation and, once 
this is agreed upon, which new models are better fit to explain players’ behavior. 
This is only a part of what experimental economists are working on. In particular, the 
other  pillar  of  most  economic  “mainstream”  analysis,  instrumental  rationality  and 
common knowledge of it, is another hot area of experimental investigation. Indeed, we 
are going to refer to this aspect insofar as it is related to the focus of our analysis. In fact, 
one  line  of  attack  towards  other-regarding  preferences  as  an  aspect  emerging  from 
experiments consists in questioning whether experimental subjects really understand the 
kind  of  game  they  are  playing.  For  instance,  when  players  cooperate  in  ”prisoner’s 
dilemma” situations it may be the case that they do not understand which choices really 
maximize their payoffs, either because the artificiality of the experimental lab situation does not provide the clues typically given in real life, or because they do not exert a high 
comprehension effort, due to the limited amount of money involved in most (though not 
all) experiments. 
The fact that people are not completely selfish can hardly come as a surprise, and indeed 
is reckoned, for instance, in overlapping generation models in which the welfare of the 
next generation is taken into account (see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989). However, it is 
often assumed, often tacitly, that non-selfish motivations are the exception, so that for 
most situations of economic interest we could safely assume selfishness by all agents to 
derive game-theoretic predictions. Technically, this is equivalent to have own payoffs as 
the only argument of any players’ utility functions. 
To  get  back  to  the  same,  classical  example,  we  find  among  the  implications of  this 
approach that if the payoff structure defines a ”prisoner’s dilemma” situation, the same 
happens when we consider utility levels. As a consequence, defection is the best response 
not  only  to  itself  but  also  to  a  cooperative  move  by  the  opponent,  and  this  holds 
independently of whether the game is played simultaneously or sequentially, one-shot or 
with  repetitions,  as  long  as  they  are  finite  (backward  induction  arguments  apply). 
Possibly quite a lot of people would deny that defection is their response to cooperation 
in all interactions which are not going to be repeated for an indefinite amount of times. 
Experiments  constitute  a  test  about  whether  this  would  be  a  void  claim  or,  rather, 
conditional cooperators constitute an important part of the population. We are in fact 
going to see that this is indeed the case and that suitable assumptions on preferences 
makes  this  behavior  compatible  with  the  application  of  familiar  game  theoretic 
techniques.  Moreover,  these  same  assumptions  explain  also  a  good  bunch  of  other 
evidence where behavior does not appear to follow what arises from self interest by all 
players and the common knowledge of this aspect. The evidence we are going to present 
follows for the most part a logical consistency, which makes it hard to believe that it 
comes out of mistakes. 
Another  point  already  worth  stressing  is  the  economic  relevance  of  those  situations 
represented in experiments. While in some settings people’s behavior is compatible both 
with  selfishness  and  with  alternative  assumptions,  so  that  for  instance  competitive 
behavior is not necessarily indication of the former, in others we find that the departure from  the  assumption  of  pure  selfishness provides  intuitive explanations  for  important 
phenomena such as, for instance, a higher frequency of contract incompleteness with 
respect  to  what  would  be  caused  only  by  excessive  costs  or  impossibility  to  write 
complete contracts. 
In the next section we are going to focus on the experiments designed especially to test 
whether selfishness can explain behavior in some simple games. In section 3 we explore 
data from prominent games such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the public good games. 
These sections illustrate how experimental evidence prompts the search for alternative 
models of preferences. Section 4 shows some of these theoretical proposals, while section 
5 is focused on experiments designed in order to contrast these theories, in order to look 
for the most successful one in explaining human behavior. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Sacrifice to hurt or to help: ultimatum, gift exchange, trust and hot response 
games 
 
Consider the following game. One player proposes a division of a pie worth, say, $10. 
The other is given the opportunity to accept the proposed division, in which case it is 
simply implemented, or to reject it, which would make both players get nothing. Which 
choices should players take? If we assume that each player is selfish and knows that the 
other is selfish as well, it is quite easy to derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
(Nash, 1950, Selten, 1975). The second player should accept any division which entails a 
positive amount for her, no matter how small; only a (10,0) should give her doubts about 
what to do. The proposer, expecting this, should leave the smallest possible amount, 1 
cent, as responder’s payoff and $9.99 for himself, unless for some reasons he is 100% 
sure that even (100,0) would be accepted, in which case he would not leave the cent 
either. Other Nash equilibria exist, with much more favorable outcomes for responders, 
but they involve non-credible threats. For instance, the best response to a responder’s 
strategy “accept only 50 or more” is the strategy with an offer of precisely 50. This would 
be  a  Nash  equilibrium,  but  not a  subgame  perfect  one:  if  an  offer is  lower  than  50, rejecting it is not the payoff maximizing response in the subgame consisting in the single 
decision node of the responders. 
There  are  now  loads  of  experimental  evidence  (see  in  particular  Güth  et  al.,  1982, 
Forsythe et al., 1994 and the review in Roth, 1995) that players behave quite differently, 
so that payoff distributions are much more equitable, and 50%- 50% is usually the modal 
division and 40% a typical average value. It may be argued that first movers simply do 
not understand the game well enough, a it requires a bit of inspection, though simple it 
can be. However, as pointed out in Roth, 1995, it happens that rejection rates make those 
type of offer quite sensible, as substantially uneven divisions are often rejected. On the 
other hand, it appears tougher  to  presume  that  second  movers  do  not  understand  the 
situation  presented  at  their  decision  node  and  possibly  become  surprised  when  they 
realize that rejection results in (0,0) distribution. It is quite clear that responders, when 
they reject, deliberately choose to hurt proposer even if this implies a cost for themselves. 
What remains a bit unclear is whether proposers give substantial amounts to responders 
for fear of rejection or for ”pure” fairness considerations. 
In this respect it is useful to compare results in the ultimatum game with the ones in the 
dictator game, as in Forsythe et al. (1994) (see also Kahneman et al., 1986). The dictator 
game has one player deciding over how to divide a pie; it can be seen as an ultimatum 
game stripped of rejection possibilities. Here we find that some players decide to take the 
whole ”pie”, but most do not. Average amounts left to the other players are lower, but 
still substantial (around 25%). The comparison indicates that most likely fairness and fear 
of rejection are present in proposers’ behavior in the ultimatum game. However, dictator 
game results have been questioned, in particular by experiments involving ”double-blind” 
procedures. Hoffman et al. (1994) find that when such procedures imply that not only 
opponents  but  even  experimenters  cannot  attribute  choices  to  subjects  (an  assistant 
collects choices in numbered envelopes and give them to another one, so that nobody can 
link choices to faces) then the percentage of dictators keeping the whole endowment 
grows  to  64%.  It  still  remains  significant,  however,  that  not  only  with  double  blind 
procedures some subjects still fail to keep all for themselves, but especially the fact that 
in  absence  of  such  procedures  results  change  in  direction  of  increasing  equality.  Of 
course,  in  principle,  standard  predictions  should  not  be  modified  just  because  of observability of choices by experimenters. In other words, effects of observability by the 
experimenters  are  per  se  a  significant  deviations  from  standard  predictions,  while 
anonymity across subjects can instead be justified by the possibility among them to make 
agreements before the experiment takes place or that revenges or rewards could take 
place out of the lab, factors that deeply change the very nature of the game. Moreover, 
procedures in Hoffman et al., e.g. substantial differences in instructions across treatments, 
were criticized and stimulated new experiments. Among them, Bolton and Zwick (1992) 
found  no  evidence  that  being  observed  by  the  experimenter  causes  any  effects  in 
ultimatum and dictator games. These contradictions are a general aspect especially strong 
in a non-strategic interaction like a dictator game, whose results in general are to be taken 
cautiously. However, their overall indication that fairness considerations do enter players’ 
mind and behavior should not be neglected. 
Also the relevance of ultimatum game results has been questioned by several economists, 
and in particular by Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1985), whose claim, in a nutshell, is 
that proposers offer equal or close to equal split as behaving as theory commands would 
make it very cheap for responders to behave irrationally and reject. While the dictator 
game  appears  to  show  that  some  role  is  also  played  by  fairness  consideration  in 
proposers’ behavior, the relevance of how cheap it is to reject is not to be overlooked. 
As a matter of fact, however, results from experiments when high stakes were involved 
confirm the tendency found in earlier experiments. In particular, Hoffman et al. (1995) 
find that whether the whole pie is worth $10 or $100 does not affect results significantly; 
Cameron (1999) and Slonim and Roth (1998) provide high stakes in countries where they 
are equivalent to one month wages or more, and still find approximately the same results. 
Another set of games widely studied goes under the denomination of ”Gift Exchange 
Game”,  following  Akerlof’s  (1982)  definition  of  labor  contracts  as  ”partial  gift 
exchange”. In fact the game, first conducted by Fehr et al. (1993), is especially devoted to 
provide intuitions about the relationship between employers and employees, for the cases 
where the former cannot completely control the latter’s behavior. In this game, the first 
mover (the ”employer”) offers an amount of money, w (”wage”) to the second mover (the 
“employee”). The second mover can reject, in which case both players get zero payoff, or 
accept. If she accepts, she has to take a choice over a costly ”effort”, e, so that her payoff will be w − c(e), with c(e) strictly increasing in e, while the first mover gets ve − w. 
Values are set in such a way that the benefit for an additional effort unit for the employer, 
v, is always greater than the marginal cost for the employee. 
It is easy to see that under standard assumptions the employees exert the minimum effort 
no matter the level of w (which they accept in any case) and, anticipating this, employers 
offer the minimum wage. During experiments, however, a number of employees exhibit 
reciprocal  behavior,  so  that  they  exert  high  effort  when  the  wage  is  high.  As  a 
consequence, employers do better, on average, when they offer high wages. This result 
resembles real life situations when employees have, for the nature of their jobs, some 
degrees of discretion over their work. It is found in this case that reciprocal behavior 
increase the total pie to share, while in the ultimatum game it may destroy it. 
While in the gift exchange game second movers choices are responsible for efficiency 
levels, in the ”Trust Game” introduced by Berg et al. (1995) these are determined by the 
first mover. In fact the first mover decides how much to transfer to the second, but the 
transfer is tripled in this passage. Then the second mover decides how much to transfer 
back. Here standard assumption would lead to no returns by the second movers in any 
case,  and,  consequently,  no  money  transferred  by  the  first.  Perhaps  not  surprisingly, 
second movers return a relevant proportion of what they receive so that it is a good policy 
for first mover to “invest” a substantial amount in the first transfer. 
All these experiments share a common feature: an important fraction of players deviate 
from own-payoff maximization in circumstances where, as second movers, their choice 
leads directly to a certain payoff distribution. Also in common across these games is the 
fact that such deviations go in the direction one would expect when assuming the natural 
tendency to reciprocate nice or bad behavior. An ultimatum responder rejecting a low 
offer or a “worker” exerting a high effort in response to a high wage take actions which 
are compatible with very intuitive reciprocity criteria. Also noteworthy is the difference, 
though:  in  the  ultimatum  game  responders  sacrifice  their  payoff  to  hurt  ”mean” 
proposers,  thereby  reducing  to  zero  the  total  pie  initially  available  to  players,  while 
workers are willing to spend their effort in order to help generous employers, and their 
choice  actually  increase  the  total  payoffs  the  experimenter  is  going  to  distribute. However, the trust game indicates that a second mover can also transfer money when this 
act does not increase the payoff sum, but only affects its distribution. 
Both positive and negative reciprocity seem to play an important role. An interesting 
experiment in Offerman (2002) presents the “hot response game”. First movers have to 
decide among a helpful and a hurtful choice. The former results in getting 8 units for 
themselves (to sum up to a previously achieved endowment) and 4 for the opponent; the 
latter in getting 11 and making her lose 4. The second mover, then, has three options: a 
“cool” reply which makes her achieve 10 additional units, nothing to the first mover; a 
“reward” choice, which gives her 9 and 4 to the first mover, and a ”punish” choice which 
also gives her 9, and ”-4” to the first mover. It is found that after a helpful choice 75% of 
second movers choose to reward, 25% a cool reply, nobody chooses to punish. The latter 
choice, instead, is taken by 83% of second movers after a hurtful choice, the rest picking 
a  cool  reply.  This  evidence  reinforces  the  tendency  not  to  take  the  own-payoff 
maximizing choice, in second mover behavior, as the cool reply is seldom selected. More 
interesting, however, is the comparison with another treatment where the first mover’s 
choice is selected by a random mechanism. In this case only 17% punish after a hurtful 
choice, while 50% reward after a helpful one. Offerman interprets this as evidence of a 
greater effect of negative, with respect to positive reciprocity: the difference it makes that 
the choice depended on first mover’s will or not is much more pronounced when we 
observe frequencies of hurtful choices than when we look at helpful ones. In other words, 
as the title says, ”hurting hurts more than helping helps” in the sense that the perception 
of bad intentions changes second movers’ behavior much more than the perception of 
good intentions. This is related by the author with the existence of a ”self-serving bias” 
according to which a player expects that an opponent must behave nicely to her, when 
given the opportunity. 
The evidence presented in this section suggests the need for economists to go beyond self 
interest to find the rationale behind human behavior. Most data we have seen so far come 
from games explicitly designed to test predictions arising from the hypothesis of self 
interest. Let us see in the next section how people behave in settings which more closely 
resemble ”traditional” playground in economics. 
  
3. Prisoner’s dilemma and public good games: the cooperation puzzle 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma is possibly the most enlightening example of what game theory 
is about, and in fact it is usually the first which is presented to students in standard 
microeconomics  course  to  spur  interest  in  game  theory.  The  interest  comes  for  the 
simplicity in representing a number of real life situations, besides the need for the police 
to  make  accomplices  confess  their  crimes.  For  instance,  nations  in  potential  conflict 
spend  incredibly  high  amounts  in  arming  even  when  their  population  have  serious 
nutrition problems. The reason their governments typically offer is that refraining from 
doing so would mean being attacked and defeated by the enemy. On the other hand, a less 
frequently  mentioned  motivation  for  failing  to  agree  on  not  buying  or  constructing 
weapons any further is the temptation each one would have on breaking the agreement, 
get weapons and attack. In game theoretical terms, this and other less dramatic situations 
feature  equilibria  characterized  by  defection  by  the  players  involved,  which  create 
allocations  which  are  inferior,  in  Pareto  sense,  with  respect  to  the  ones  available  if 
players chose cooperation. 
Andreoni and Miller (1993) ran a prisoner’s dilemma experiment lasting 10 rounds, a 
duration  players  knew  ex-ante.  The  well  known  and  previously  mentioned  backward 
induction  reasoning leads  to  predict  defection in  all  rounds by  both  players  in every 
couple. However, their results are characterized by fairly high cooperation rates in round 
1 (60% approximately) and a steady decay till very low levels in the last round. 
It could be argued that players are learning the ”proper” way to play, i.e. to defect, during 
the  game. We  should  notice,  though,  that  behavior in  all  couples appears  to  show  a 
frequent  type  of  logic  by  a  certain  number:  cooperate  until  your  opponent  defects. 
However, it also happens that a first defection in the couple is relatively more frequent 
the closer we get to the last round. These results, and indeed the design of the experiment 
itself, are closely related to the theoretical model exposed in Kreps et al. (1982). In this 
model  it  is  shown  that  cooperation  by  a  self-interested  agent  can  be  rational  if  his 
expectation to meet an altruistic player, in the sense of being willing to cooperate as long 
as the other does, is strictly positive. Clearly, as rounds pass by and the end gets closer, the expected returns from cooperation get lower and this explains the increasing tendency 
to defect. So, experimental data are consistent with the model. By the same token, we 
should  expect  that  if  the  two  players  are  not  going  to  be  matched  together  again 
cooperation  rates  should  not  be  significant.  However,  in  the  so  called  ”stranger” 
treatment also proposed in Andreoni and Miller (1993), where players are rematched at 
every  round  with  a  mechanism  ensuring  no  repetition  among  any  two  players, 
cooperation is still substantial, although lower than in the ”partner” treatment previously 
described. The authors conclude that the overall evidence shows that reputation building 
is taking place and therefore some players behave as if they were altruistic, as shown by 
higher cooperation in the partner treatment, but at the same time some agents are really 
altruistic, otherwise no cooperation at all should take place in the stranger treatment. 
Public good games can be seen as an extension of prisoner’s dilemmas. They involve two 
or more players and typically several alternatives, in term of contribution level. Public 
goods are characterized, in their typical definition, by non-rivalry and non-excludability. 
These features make them be produced in an inefficiently low quantity, when production 
decisions are taken separately. In fact, the cost of a single agent’s production is born by 
himself, while the benefits are reaped by the whole society (or whatever group of people 
in consideration). This is a case of positive externalities which leads to under-production. 
In  experiments  on  the  production  public  goods,  often  called  “voluntary  contribution 
mechanisms”, a typical representation of an agent i’s payoff is: 
 
πi = ei − gi  + m∑jgj 
 
where  ei  is his endowment (often assumed to be the same among all agents) and gi his 
contribution to the public good. m represents the public good technology, and as a rule m 
<  1  <  mN holds,  where N  is the  group  size.  The  first  part, m  <  1,  implies  that  the 
marginal return of contribution for an individual, (−1+m), is always negative, so that his 
self interest commands zero cooperation in the basic one-shot game, and in the finitely 
repeated  game.  The  second  inequality,  mN  >  1  implies  that  the  social  returns  from 
contribution  are  positive.  So,  just  as  in  the  prisoner’s  dilemma,  we  have  a  Nash equilibrium solution, zero contribution by all players, which is Pareto inefficient with 
respect to the social optimum, reached if everybody contributes the whole endowment. 
Just like the main features, also the pattern of the deviations from predictions is quite 
similar  to  the  prisoner’s  dilemma:  contribution  levels  are  typically  significant  at  the 
beginning, for instance at 40% in Isaac and Walker (1988) and the decay as rounds go by. 
Also here, we have evidence of what could be thought as learning the ”right” strategy. 
However, studies like Andreoni (1988) and Croson (1996) show examples of ”restart 
effect”. What happens in their data is that if the same players who played a public good 
experiments in which indeed a decay was observed are rematched and start the game 
anew, then their contribution levels resemble the ones of the first round in the previous 
play.  Of  course,  this  is  not  compatible  with  the  idea  that  they  were  previously 
contributing low amounts before just because they had learned that contributing more is a 
bad idea. 
Other interesting findings include the positive effects on contribution levels of increasing 
group size when the m factor is kept constant, which suggests that ”efficiency gains” 
matter (see, e.g., Brandts and Schram, 2001), and of allowing pre-play communication 
which in principle should be irrelevant “cheap talk” (Isaac and Walker, 1988). 
Of particular relevance, in terms of tracking down motivations, are recent studies by 
Keser  and  VanWinden  (2000)  and  Fischbacher  et  al.  (2001).  The  former  replicate 
evidence of steady decay in contribution in a ”stranger” treatment and observe closely 
behavior in a ”partner” treatment to find that agents tend to adjust to the group average, 
which gives evidence of ”conditional cooperation behavior. Fischbacher et al. test this 
possibility more directly, by allowing one member per group to revise his contribution 
decision; they find that 50% of players adjust to group averages as the main indicator of 
non-selfish  behavior.  Finally,  the  most  dramatic  change  with  respect  to  free-riding 
outcomes  is  found  by  Fehr  and  Gaechter  (2000).  They  introduce  a  punishment 
mechanism  which  allow  players  to  reduce  any  opponent’s  payoff,  but  at  a  cost  of 
reducing their own. Predictions stemming from standard assumptions do not take into 
account  this  possibility  in  a  finitely  repeated  game,  as  a  selfish  player  would  never 
punish.  However  the  evidence  shows  that  free  riders  are  heavily  punished  by  high 
contributors and, especially, that the former (instead of the latter as in standard public good games experiments) quickly adapt their behavior, so that average contribution levels 
go up and stay very close to full contribution till the last round of the experiment. 
The overall message of this section is that intuitive deviations from strategies deduced 
from  standard  homo  economicus  reasoning  affect  substantially  the  results  we  get  in 
games  which,  due  to  their  socio-economic  relevance,  have  traditionally  been  in  the 
spotlight of economic analysis. This fact, in conjunction what we have already seen in the 
previous section, motivates the quest for new theories of human behavior better fit to 
accommodate this puzzling evidence. 
 
 
4. Explaining experimental evidence: learning and social preference models 
 
4.1 Learning models 
 
Some interesting models based on assumptions of bounded rationality were proposed to 
explain ultimatum game results. In particular, Roth and Erev (1995) argue that a decisive 
aspect behind results consists in the fact that rejecting low offers has a mild cost for 
responder, while proposing an excessively – from the responder’s point of view - unfair 
allocation which causes rejection results in a great loss, with respect to what would be 
achieved offering the minimum amount that a responder would take. Then a learning 
model based on adapting choices to payoffs in previous rounds show that self-interest is 
indeed compatible with ultimatum game results once we relax rationality assumptions. In 
the same direction goes the logit equilibrium proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), 






j/µ)                (1) 
 
where pi is the probability that choice i is taken among the available alternatives and the 
error  parameter,  µ,  determines  the  sensitivity  of  choice  probabilities  to  payoff 
differences.  McKelvey  and  Palfrey  apply  the  analysis  to  the  centipede  game,  where 
indeed the potential length of the strategic interaction - which is reduced to an immediate ”take” choice in a not so immediately recognizable subgame perfect Nash equilibrium - 
gives a solid ground to the applications of bounded rationality models. However, we 
would  argue  again  that  limitations  of  rationality  should  not  be  taken  as  the  main 
explanation for simple decision nodes as the responder’s in the ultimatum game. In other 
words, we think that learning aspects may rather be a complement, in some complex 





One  of  the  most  intuitive  ways  of  incorporating  other-regarding  preferences  in  the 
economic analysis is to assume that other players’ payoff enter positively some player’s 
utility function, in other word that these players are altruistic (e.g. Becker, 1974 and 
various references in Zamagni, 1995). This could explain why cooperation is observed in 
prisoner  dilemma  and  public  good  games,  for instance,  but  especially  the  fact that  a 
fraction  of  players  give  something  to  their  opponents  in  dictator  games.  Formally, 
denoting payoffs with π, a player i is altruistic with respect to the members of his N size 
group if: 
 
ui = ui(π1, ..., πi, ..., πN ),                 (2) 
 
with ∂ui/∂πj> 0 for all j = 1, ..., N 
 
One objection to this approach comes from Andreoni’s (1989) “warm glow” theory, in 
which it is argue that players value the sheer act of giving, so that, for instance, public 
funding does not ”crowd out” private donations. 
More radical objections can be issued, however. In particular, we have observed that 
most  non-selfish  players  behave  as  conditional  cooperators,  while  according  to  (2) 
                                                 
1 An illuminating example is found in Goeree and Holt (2000) as an explanation of the 
effects  of  fixed  assignments  by  the  experimenter  in  a  two-stage  alternating  offer 
bargaining game. 
 opponent’s defective behavior should not, in principle, prevent totally future cooperative 
acts. That is to say that those players’ behavior does not appear to be consistent with (2) 
throughout the rounds of the experiments, while of course an alternative utility function 
should be stable in its ability to explain choices. Moreover, hurtful choices cannot be 
justified by the functional form in (2), but indeed they do occur in a variety of settings, 
such as the ultimatum game and the public good game with punishment. 
 
4.3 Intention-based theories 
 
Levine  (1998)  propose  a  model  in  which  other  players’  intentions  enters  the  utility 
function as follows: 
 
ui = πi +∑j≠iπj(ai + λaj)/(1 + λ)               (3) 
 
with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and −1 < ai < 1 for all players. 
 
The  ai  parameter  denotes  a  ”general”  tendency  of  player  i  towards  other  players:  if 
positive, i tends to be altruistic, if negative he is “spiteful”. The λ parameter is what 
accounts for modifications in behavior depending on opponents’: previous experience is 
used to estimate the value a of any given opponent. If λ > 0, then a player tends to be 
nicer towards the altruistic players, and meaner towards the spiteful ones. 
Rabin (1993) seminal contribution, aimed at entering psychology into game theoretical 
analysis, is based on a “kindness function” by which a player evaluates how kind his 
opponent is. The model incorporates believes entertained by a player not only on how his 
opponent behaves, but also on what a player believes his opponent believes about his 
own choice; a ”fairness equilibrium” is defined as a set of strategies which are reciprocal 
best response and a set of rational expectations consistent with the actions involved in the 
equilibrium. Based on Rabin’s model, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) introduce the 
”Sequential  Reciprocity  Equilibrium”  in  which  players  keep  track  of  beliefs  about 
intentions  after  observing  actions  in  each  round  of  a  repeated  game,  while  Rabin’s 
approach is focused on normal form games. The common feature of these models is that they involve a large number of parameters 
and  typically  involve  a  multiplicity  of  equilibria.  That  is  to  say,  their  possibility  of 
explaining a larger part of human behavior, such as conditional cooperation, comes at a 
cost of increasing substantially the complexity of the analysis. 
 
4.4 Distributional preferences 
 
Bolton (1991) proposes relative income as an additional factor into players’ utility. In 
particular, in two-player games his formulation is: 
 
ui = ui(πi, πi/πj),                   (4) 
 
with ∂ui/∂(πi/πj) > 0 if πi < πj , and ∂ui/∂(πi/πj) = 0 otherwise. 
 
The intuition is quite simple: you dislike to be worse off than another player and so the 
more you reduce unfavorable inequality the better. If the other player is not better off, 
then  you  do  not  care  about  her  payoff.  This  model  is  compatible  with  ultimatum 
rejections and with punishment following free riding in a public good game. However, it 
cannot  explain  ”nice”  behavior  towards  opponents  such  as  giving  in  dictator  game, 
returning favors in the gift exchange and in the trust games and conditional cooperation 
in dilemma games. 
This criticism appears to be shared by the author, as in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) we 
find related but more general formulation: 




σi =πi/∑jπj   if   ∑jπj≠0 
 
and 
 σi =1/N   if   ∑jπj=0 
 
 
For a given level of own payoff πi, the maximum utility is reached when σi = 1/N . That 
is, a player is happier if his proportion of wealth is equitable. On the other hand, as we 
would expect, for a given proportion σi his utility is increasing in his own wealth. This 
model incorporates aversion also with respect to favorable inequality and is compatible 
with the evidence that Bolton (1991) failed to explain. 
A similar logic is at the basis of the model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), in 
which we have: 
 
ui(πi, π−i) = πi −[1/(N − 1)]∑j≠iα max{πj − πi, 0} −[1/(N − 1)]∑j≠iβmax{πi − πj, 0} (6) 
 
α measures aversion to unfavorable inequality, or ”envy”, β the aversion to favorable 
inequality, or ”guilt”. Both this and Bolton and Ockenfels models are compatible with 
behavior in a variety of games. In particular, ultimatum rejections after an unfair offer 
can be caused by aversion to unfavorable inequality, while second mover’s behavior in 
the gift exchange game and in the trust game reduces the favorable inequality arising 
from a generous first move. Giving in dictator game is also compatible with these models 
according  to  the  same  logic;  the  linear  formulation  in  (6)  would  actually  imply  that 
players should choose between sharing equally the ”pie” or not giving anything, while a 
few  choices  are  somewhere  in the  middle.  Linearity is  chosen  to  keep  the  model  as 
simple as  possible  while  at  the  same time  more  determinate  than  in  (5). Conditional 
cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma and in public good game are in line with these models, 
too, as after a round where a player defects, the cooperator is worse off and therefore 
motivated to switch to defection. Punishment behavior is also compatible, as the damage 
for the punished is bigger than the expense for the punisher. However, the fact that only 
free riders are punished is more in line with (6): if instead a player’s concern were only 
on getting closer to the average, then it would be indifferent with respect to whom to 
punish.  Evidence  in  Falk  et  al.  (2000)  remarks  this  aspect:  a  cooperator  never  hurts another cooperator even if doing so would improve his relative payoff, making it closer 
to the average (as some agents defected). 
Moreover, both couples of authors underline - also in their titles - that not only equity and 
reciprocity (Bolton and Ockenfels) and fairness and cooperation (Fehr and Schmidt) can 
be explained, but also competitive behavior leading to unequal outcomes. In particular, 
variations  of  the  ultimatum  games  include  competition  among  proposers  or  among 
responders. In those games it actually happens that the way to play predicted by these 
models converges  to the  one  envisaged  by  “standard  models”  predictions:  the player 
alone on one side of the market enjoys outcomes in which he gets the maximum payoff 
while  the  others  are  left  with  almost  nothing.  In  those  games  the  advantaged player 
knows that all but one player on the long side of the market will be left with nothing in 
any  case.  Therefore,  picking  the  highest  offer  does  not  affect  inequality  levels 
substantially, while improving his own payoff. On the other hand, on the long side of the 
market the possible presence of a single selfish player drives behavior towards bidding up 
offers or minimum acceptance levels. As a matter of fact, preferences are not assumed to 
be homogeneous in neither of the models; in particular, Fehr and Schmidt’s calibrations 
find that the presence of a percentage (around 30%) of purely selfish players is a constant 
across most games. Their behavior, though, is affected by the presence of non-selfish 
players, so that for instance a first mover in a gift exchange game may behave generously 
even if he is only concerned about his own payoff. 
 
4.5 Social welfare orientation 
 
Charness and Rabin recently proposed a new model where players are assumed to care 
about social welfare as defined by the following function: 
 
Wi(π1, ..., πi, ...πN) = δ min{π1, ..., πi, ...πN} + (1 − δ)∑jπj         (7) 
 
As we can see this function combines efficiency in term of payoff sum with a Rawlsian 
maximin  criterion.  Then  an  agent  i  who  assigns  weight  λi  on  this  social  component 
maximizes:  
ui = (1 − λi)πi + λiWi(π1, ..., πi, ...πN )              (8) 
 
This model captures evidence found by the authors themselves and others (see below) of 
efficiency oriented behavior. For instance, they find that most players when choosing as 
dictators prefer (own payoff, opponent’s) the allocation (400,700) to (400,400). However, 
this model fails to capture punishment and ultimatum rejections. For this reason, they 
propose an extension in which, more or less in the same logic as in Rabin (1993) or in 
Levine (1988) players evaluate each other’s social welfare orientation, i.e. the parameter 
λ. A player who is found to put a “too low” weight on social welfare stimulates negative 
reciprocity and therefore may be punished. They acknowledge the complexity involved in 
this variation and argue that among simple models, theirs is to be preferred to the ones 
involving inequality aversion in terms of ability to explain a wider array of economically 
relevant interaction. 
With this argument we are introduced to an exciting area of investigation which we deal 
with in the next section. 
 
 
5. Which social preferences? 
 
So far we have seen alternative models which are able to explain an important part of that 
reality that models based on assuming pure selfishness fail to capture. Pure altruism is 
probably the criterion that proved to be the weakest among the ones proposed above. In 
the next paragraphs we present the evidence about the two main comparisons raised in 
this respect. 
 
5.1 Equality versus reciprocity 
 
Models based on reciprocity have a very intuitive appeal: most people would agree that it 
is  a  ”good  thing”  to  ”help  nice  people  and  hurt  the  mean”.  However,  incorporating 
reciprocity  comes  at  a  cost  of  high  complexity.  This  is  not  the  case  with  inequality aversion:  the  formulation  in  Fehr  and  Schmidt,  in  particular,  only  involve  two 
parameters. The question is whether simplicity comes at the cost of failing to explain 
many relevant results in social and economic interaction. 
A  couple  of  variations  of  the  ultimatum  game  point  in  this  direction.  Blount (1995) 
replaces first mover’s choice with a random draw. Knowing this, second movers are more 
willing  to  accept  unfair  outcomes.  This  is  evidence  that  responders  take  proposers’ 
intentions into account, when they reject unfair offers. In Falk et al. (2000) and in Brandts 
and Solà (2001) a (8,2) (proposer’s payoff first) proposal is more frequently rejected 
when the alternative available to proposers is (5,5) than if it is (2,8) or (10,0); this shows 
that how equitable alternatives were also matters. With a rationale similar to Blount’s, 
Falk et al. (2000b) show evidence that in a sequential games results change depending on 
whether first mover’s choices were intentional or randomly determined, but distributional 
concerns are also relevant, in deciding whether and how much to punish or to reward first 
movers. 
Other studies, however, found results showing little or no importance of intentions. For 
instance,  Cox  (forthcoming)  find  that  the  replacement  of  an intentional  move  with  a 
random mechanism does not weaken the tendency found in trust games to give back a 
substantial part of the investment made by the first mover. Bolton et al. (2000) find that 
in a sequential game where second movers have to pick among five alternatives payoff 
allocations, the distribution of their choices does not vary depending on whether this 
decisional node was reached after a good, a bad or a neutral choice by the first mover, in 
terms of an easy comparison with the alternative path he could have taken. We argue that 
in all those settings intentions were given a very good chance to affect outcomes and it is 
not always the case that they do, unlike what could be expected taking into account that 
we are talking about choices by players which do not comply with predictions based on 
self interest. There is clearly scope for further research, in particular about which factors 
drive apparently contradictory evidence. By now, we cautiously argue that the present 
evidence does not indicate compelling reasons to incur in the cost of complexity required 




5.2 Equality versus efficiency 
 
The  previously  mentioned  model  by  Charness  and  Rabin  predicts  that  subjects  are 
motivated by a function which includes the total payoff to be distributed. In the same 
paper  they  present  evidence  that  in  dictator  games  many  players  are  willing  to  take 
choices  in  this  direction,  even  if  they  imply  increasing  inequality.  Several  authors 
performed tests giving different results. Bolle and Kritikos, for instance, confirm that the 
payoff sum matters for several players, while Güth et al. (2003) and Morgenstern (2003) 
find that efficiency plays no role. 
Some tentative conclusions may be derived: it appears that efficiency concerns vanish 
when strategic interactions are happening. In the latter case, agents resist with particular 
strength  to  the  idea  of  allowing  opponents  to  go  with  higher  payoff,  and  also  show 
willingness to transfer money even when this does not increase the total pie (as in the 
trust game). This led Fehr and Schmidt (2002) to underline that ”the Dictator Game is 
different from many economically important games and real life situations” and ”where 
both players have some power to affect the outcome, the surplus maximization motive is 
less important”. Moreover, as previously stressed, dictator game results are in general the 
least stable with respect to small variations in procedures, as the evidence reported here 
also  confirms,  while  results  in  strategic  interactive  settings  are  often  confirmed  even 




We  explored  the  evidence  contradicting  predictions  arising  from  standard  “homo 
economicus” assumptions of rationality, selfishness and common knowledge of these two 
                                                 
2 Charness and Rabin themselves use (8) but not the reciprocity-based modification to 
evaluate the data they collected, which shows how difficult it can be to derive clear-cut 
predictions from models incorporating intentions. features. These data are gathered not only in games created in order to test the validity of 
those assumptions, but also in others which, due to their relevance, have always been a 
main focus of economic analysis, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and public good games. 
These findings stimulated the research towards ways to incorporate aspects of “social 
preferences” which appear consistent with data into the economic analysis. Therefore 
models were created which include altruism, reciprocity (the so-called “intention-based” 
models), inequality aversion and “social welfare”. The authors of these models stress 
their predictive power on a wide range of phenomena observed in the experimental lab, 
although it is typically the case that each model fails at some relevant game. 
New  theories,  in  turn,  stimulated  new  experimental  research  to  further  test  their 
predictive power. The findings are by no means definitive, although there is possibly 
wide agreement on the weakness of ”pure altruism” with respect to the other alternatives 
to self interest. However, we claim that by now most evidence is in concordance with 
inequality aversion models; incorporating reciprocity can enhance predictive power but 
not as much - in our view - as to justify the great cost in terms of complexity and, often, 
equilibrium multiplicity. Efficiency criteria, on the other hand, seem to have a scope 
limited to particular settings where strategic interaction is absent. 
A final note is about a further direction of research, which consists in applying those 
models  to  a  wide  range  of  games.  An  obvious,  already  explored  but  still  worth 
investigating setting is the relationship principal-agent, in particular in terms of whether 
contracts should be made as complete as possible or not. Indeed, fairness minded agents 
may exert high efforts even if - or perhaps especially if - contracts are left incomplete and 
control mechanisms are relaxed. Other results (Huck et al., 2001) show that inequality 
aversion drives towards puzzling evidence in Stackelberg competition, namely upward 
sloping response functions by followers. This indicates that areas of applications of these 
models really abound. One merit of this research, indeed, is to have shown that the scope 
of economic analysis is not limited by these aspects of human behavior, but actually 
enriched. 
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